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RESUMEN
Este artículo analiza los intentos por parte del estado español de ofre-
cer un marco regulatorio para las relaciones industriales a principios del
siglo XX. Se discute aquí que el conflicto principal se centraba en el reco-
nocimiento de los sindicatos por parte de los propietarios de empresas,
lo que hacía que cualquier acuerdo para finalizar huelgas en curso fuera
muy inestable. Respondiendo a un movimiento obrero cada vez más
activo, el Estado intentó regular las huelgas, pero sin embargo no se
decidió a forzar a los empresarios a reconocer a los sindicatos. Esto dio
pie a la formulación de un sistema transitorio que duró casi veinte años
en el que el empresariado pedía constantemente al estado que garanti-
zara la libertad de trabajo en las huelgas y el estado selectivamente des-
oía a los empresarios para forzarles a conceder algunas de las demandas
de los trabajadores y evitar que los conflictos sociales adquirieran mayo-
res proporciones. Se analiza con detalle el papel del estado en las huel-
gas y se muestra cómo la intervención de las autoridades —generalmen-
te del gobernador civil— aseguraba la concesión de al menos algunas de
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las reclamaciones de los trabajadores. Finalmente, se argumenta que
este equilibrio institucional generaba la radicalización y movilización de
empresarios y trabajadores.
Palabras clave: relaciones industriales, huelgas, cambio institucio-
nal, Restauración, España
ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the attempts of the Spanish state to regulate
industrial relations in the early 20th century. The main conflict being over
union recognition, workers faced strong opposition from employers,
which generated a situation in which all possible agreements to end stri-
kes were unstable. Faced with an increasingly active labour movement,
the state tried to regulate industrial conflict but hesitated to apply state
authority to force recalcitrant employers to recognize unions. A transi-
tory system was in place for more than 20 years in which the state and
employers clashed over the issue of the freedom to work and the state
selectively applied its coercive power to force employers to give up on
some of the strikers’ demands. Tracing the role of authorities in strikes,
I show how the intervention of state officials in strikes granted workers
at least the partial satisfaction of their demands. I finally argue that state
intervention in industrial conflict fuelled the radicalism of both unions
and employers’ associations.
Keywords: industrial relations, strikes, institutional change, Restau-
ración, Spain
JEL Classification: J52, J58, J83, J88, K31
1. THE PROBLEM OF UNIONS
The evolution and consolidation of the Spanish labour movement has
been one of the classical themes in Spanish contemporary history.
Drifting towards radical politics and revolution, working class institu-
tions have been traditionally singled out as one of the sources of insta-
bility within the pseudo-democratic regime of the Restauración and the
democratic experiments of the First and Second Republics. As Edward
Malefakis put it, also in reference to the Italian case:
«[...] the Spanish and Italian working classes and their movements
remained far less integrated with the rest of society than was true
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2 Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (henceforth, DSC) 1902, 3597.
3 DSC (1902): 3926.
4 Quoted in DSC (1902), 4015.
in Western and Central Europe, particularly in the pre-communist
era. [...] There was no decrease in collective violence as worker
organization spread, no reasonably secure hegemony of reformist
leaders, [...], no abandonment of revolutionary goals in revolutio-
nary situations for the defense of democratic capitalist regimes» 1.
In this paper, I concentrate on the reaction of the state to the spread
of strikes in the early 20th century to understand the origins of the cor-
poratist formalization of industrial relations that took place in the mid
1920s and was consolidated during the Second Republic. In this context,
corporatist institutions can be seen as an attempt to tame the potential
revolutionary fervour of the Spanish working classes, a necessary condi-
tion for political stability, and, exclusively in the case of the Second
Republic, also as an attempt by the state to incorporate the legitimate
aspirations of the working classes into the polity of the country. As I
show in the paper, however, the initial response of the state to strikes in
the «formative» period of 1900-1915 was characteristically non-corpora-
tist, relying on local authorities and a combination of conciliation and
repression strategies.
In spite of the accumulated experience of social conflict in some of
the main Spanish cities during the 19th century, the levels of social unrest
and the visible evolution of labour organizations shocked contempora-
ries in the late 19th and early 20th century. Probably no political or social
issue generated more controversy than the so-called cuestión social (the
social issue). After the general strike of Barcelona in 1902, a
Conservative Catalan deputy claimed in Parliament: «I have known
Barcelona for many years now, I have observed her in the most tragic
moments, in political revolts, in mutinies [...], but I can say that I had
never witnessed the spectacle of these last days» 2. In his view, the gene-
ral strike had been an attempt to «stage what had been staged [sic] years
ago in the Commune of Paris». According to one of the leaders of the
Conservative Party, what had happened in Barcelona was «more serious
than mutiny, more serious than sedition, more serious than revolu-
tion» 3. La Veu de Catalunya, a conservative Catalan newspaper, woke up
the spectres of Jacobin terror: «we seriously warn workers: our middle
class is not as tame as the one that got herself killed in 1793» 4.
Somewhat exaggerated, these impressions appeared in the wake of
the labour movement after the period of relative social peace in the
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5 IRS (1907). For the case of Valencia in which re-organization also took place after
1899: Reig (1986): 259-61.
6 Bengoechea (1994), 129.
7 On the whole episode, Díaz del Moral (1973), 171-172.
second half of the 1880s and 1890s. The early 1880s had witnessed a re-
organization of the Spanish International and the resurgence of strikes
in the period 1881-1883, but the events of the Mano Negra in 1883 were
used to justify the repression of the rising strike movement and the ban-
ning of the International. In the 1890s, after the promising start of the
celebration of the first May Day in Barcelona and Bilbao, the harassment
of the state towards the anarchists, after their terrorist campaign in the
mid 1890s, hindered the development of the labour movement. From
1899 onwards, an important cycle of strikes unfolded coupled with the
re-organization of unions across Spain. In Barcelona, at the peak of stri-
ke wave in 1903-1904, about 60 per cent of the unions had been re-orga-
nized or created from scratch in the years 1899-1904 5. In the important
Catalan textile industry, a federation of unions (Federación de la Industria
Textil Española) was created in 1899 6. The construction workers of
Barcelona won a 13,000 strong strike in Barcelona in which the eight-
hour day was conceded. In the area of Bilbao, after the successful May
Day strike of 1890, no other general strike was organized until 1903.
Among miners in Asturias, an ultimately failed unionization drive was
attempted in 1903. More importantly, a recently created Federación de
Sociedades Obreras de la Región Española (Spanish Federation of Spanish
Workers’ Resistance Societies) organized a series of general strikes in the
years 1901 and 1902 in some important provincial capitals —like
Barcelona, Oviedo, Gijón, Valencia, La Coruña, or Zaragoza—, and in
several Andalusian towns 7.
Even if demands to shorten the workday or to raise wages were cen-
tral to the unions’ program, the aspirations of organized labour did not
focus exclusively on economic demands. The strike wave of 1899-1903
attempted to re-shape the employer-workers relationship by requiring
employers to accept a written collective contract (bases de trabajo) or to
concede a symbolic demand such as the eight-hour day. Therefore, the
final objective of the strike movement was the more fundamental
demand of union recognition, i.e. the right of unions to participate in the
collective determination of working conditions and the recognition by
employers of the bargaining power of organized labour.
In this paper, I consider the Spanish debate on the role of unions and
the dynamics of institutional change on the creation of formal bargai-
ning institutions. I argue that the private solution to this social problem
was impossible given distributional conflicts and transaction costs
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9 Describing these institutions as «informal» is in itself problematic. In the institutio-
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10 Olson (1995), 79.
11 Shorter and Tilly (1974), 39. Friedman (1998), 13.
12 Freeman (1997), 9-10.
13 Brenan (1943), 185. Díaz del Moral (1973 [1928]), chapter 1. See also Meaker (1974), 2.
making private, voluntary agreements difficult and unstable. When this
is so, the literature on institutional change argues that, in the case of a
failure of the private solution, agents with an interest in reform might see
the political solution as the most cost-effective means of overcoming the
transaction costs that hinder the private solution 8. Following this logic,
workers turned to the public arena to express their grievances. Strikes,
especially large strikes in important cities, necessarily involved political
and military authorities in the solution of the conflict. In the period, an
«informal» system of strike arbitration (e.g. not institutionalized by the
force of law) was created in which strikers, employers, and state officials
interacted strategically 9. Strike waves and unionization drives did not
require a top-down political change, as described in Olson’s explanation
of union growth in which the state’s support of collective bargaining
through laws on strike arbitration and collective bargaining is the cru-
cial factor explaining workers’ mobilization 10. Along with Edward
Shorter, Charles Tilly and Gerald Friedman, all writing with specific
reference to the French case, I stress that the strategic interaction bet-
ween state and the labour movement, rather than deciding state support
of the labour movement, explains processes of union growth and strike
waves in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as well as the characteris-
tics of collective mobilization of both workers and employers 11. Top-
down and bottom-up forces, to use the terms coined by Richard
Freeman in his influential paper on processes of union growth, seem to
have been equally important 12. Spanish labour history has probably put
excessive emphasis on bottom-up processes of labour mobilization,
which only consider exogenous social, organizational, and economic
changes within the labour movement. Gerald Brenan identified the spre-
ad of anarcho-syndicalism in Catalonia with the immigration of mostly
illiterate peasants from Andalusia, echoing the early association made
by Juan Díaz del Moral of the revolutionary hopes of the Andalusian pea-
santry with forms of popular religiousness 13. In his authoritative work
on Catalan unions from 1903 to 1920, Pere Gabriel stresses the organi-
zational innovation of the sindicato único, or «one big union» in the
translation of Benjamin Martin, in explaining the rise of the National
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Confederation of Labour (CNT) since 1916 14. Other authors have focu-
sed on structural problems in the economy. Joan Connelly Ulman consi-
dered widespread unemployment among Catalan textile workers in the
early 20th century as one the main explanations of the first general stri-
ke in Barcelona in 1902 and of the popularity of anarcho-syndicalism in
Catalonia 15. More recently, Angel Smith focused on the erosion of wor-
king conditions in several trades in Barcelona to explain most of the
radicalization of the labour movement in the city after 1907 16.
These explanations, although attractive, have several problems. First,
the literature on collective action generally stresses that there is a weak
link between poverty and collective action 17. Alienated, recent immi-
grants were not at the forefront of urban labour struggles in the late
1910s, especially because Andalusian peasants constituted only a tiny
portion of the immigrants to Catalonia and the North of Spain in the
early 20th century. Second, it is not clear that the sindicato único was the
optimal institution. This organization orchestrated an extraordinarily
successful general strike in Barcelona in 1919, but could not maintain
the spectacular membership gains of 1918-1919. Rather, the único was
an adequate institution given the political context of the years 1918-1920
and membership simply responded to changes in the costs of collective
action caused by changes in government policy towards unions. Finally,
structural explanations based on changes in the economy do not fit the
timing of strike waves in early 20th century Spain. They might well
explain the strike wave of 1902-1903 as a response to some previous or
contemporary economic crisis, but fail to predict the increases in strike
activity in other years, especially in the early 1910s. In contrast with pre-
vious explanations, the aim of this paper is to put state policy and its cru-
cial interaction with unions in the history of the Spanish labour move-
ment during the Restauración. The main reason for doing this is to
achieve a more adequate balance between top-down and bottom-up
explanations of the evolution of the labour movement in Spain.
2. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTS
Distributional conflicts were a serious limitation to the recognition of
unions and the organization of formal institutions for collective bargai-
ning like arbitration committees and joint boards of independent wor-
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kers’ representatives and employers. When tried, these organizations
proved to be extremely unstable and they rarely operated for more than
some months after a strike had taken place. The literature on institutio-
nal change argues that when the number of potential bargaining agents
is large and agents have private information, the co-operative solution to
the collective problem breaks down 18. If there is asymmetric informa-
tion and the number of bargaining agents is large, every agent has an
incentive to misrepresent the true expected pay-offs from the new insti-
tution —potential losers would over-report expected losses— leading to
inefficient outcomes, e.g. a potentially more efficient institution would
not be adopted. In the period, however, the greatest resistance to the
recognition of unions was found in the highly concentrated mining, rail-
ways or iron and steel sectors, where the number of bargaining agents
was small in relative terms. Moreover, in spite of the fact that employers’
associations in the early 20th century were poorly developed, unions
minimized the number of bargaining opponents by selecting the largest
employers in a given town 19. For example, the textile workers’ strike in
Manresa, leading to a general strike in the whole sector in the summer
of 1890, was organized against a pay cut in the factory Els Dolors, or, in
1906, the failed unionization drives of the Asturian miners’ union cen-
tred around Hullera Española 20.
A more plausible explanation is that compensating payments for
employers could not be devised and that, because agreements were not
binding, the organization of a collective bargaining system required res-
traint on the part of workers and reducing post-strike employers’ oppor-
tunism 21. Transactions costs and distributional conflicts therefore pre-
vented efficiency-enhancing institutional change. For example, with a
royal decree establishing mandatory hours ceilings after the textile stri-
ke of 1913, employers conditioned their acceptance of the 60 hour wor-
king week on the reduction of the «surcharges of 10 and 15 per cent on
industrial taxes in water-powered factories and a general reduction in
industrial tax rates», accompanied by the pressure of the government on
railway firms to reduce transport fares for raw materials and manufac-
tured goods 22. In addition, employers demanded that any agreement
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taken to settle the strike be binding for ten years 23. Since there is no evi-
dence that these demands were ever met, the decree failed to be enfor-
ced and caused multiple conflicts up to 1918. Other cases of political
horse- trading can also be found in the large mining strikes of 1903 and
1910 or in the railway workers’ strike of 1912.
Given these difficulties, except for some extremely stable sectors like
barrel-making, the printing trades or hat making, characterized by small
establishments employing highly skilled workers, voluntary agreements
between employers and workers to sustain collective bargaining institu-
tions were extremely unstable and only supported by exceptional econo-
mic circumstances. After a series of failed union recognition strikes,
employers finally recognized the Asturian Miners’ Union in 1912, a
period of fast growth of exports 24. Catalan textile workers only enjoyed
more or less sustained collective bargaining in the early 1880s, and that
only in the large establishments around Barcelona 25. The joint board of
employers and workers devised as a solution to the 1890 strike in
Manresa was short-lived and the subsequent employers’ lock-out marked
the decline of the Tres Classes de Vapor in the Catalan textile sector 26. In
Barcelona, building construction workers were formally engaged in a
period of collective bargaining with their employers after the 1901 stri-
ke, which included the creation of a joint board of workers and emplo-
yers, which however rarely met and could not avoid another strike in
1903 27. After the strike failed and with the end of exceptional labour
market conditions, employers turned to individual contracting.
Exceptional labour market conditions in the Madrid building industry
made collective bargaining possible up to 1911 28. These examples con-
trast with the case of the metal workers of Barcelona, who were never
able to enforce a collective contract with employers in spite of spectacu-
lar general strikes in late 1901 and in 1910.
3. STATE POLICY
At the same time that unions pushed for recognition and their subse-
quent stabilization in a system of collective bargaining, a set of jurists
and political writers, following developments from more advanced
nations like Germany, France or Italy, recognized the deficiencies of the
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classic liberal codes inherited from the Napoleonic code and the need to
make parts of the existing codes more «social», i.e. adapted to the rise of
labour unrest and other related problems like poverty or urban squalor.
In the views of the leading members of this group of reformers, the prin-
ciple of free contract was to be overcome by the recognition of the inhe-
rent weakness of workers in the contract relationship and the need to
involve workers in the collective negotiation of working conditions to
curb labour unrest.
Despite their alleged sympathy for working class organizations, refor-
mers were keenly aware of the political and potentially revolutionary
content of Spanish unions. According to the social-catholic sociologist
Eduardo Sanz Escartín, the Spanish working class was dominated by
«anti-social anarchism» 29. Another contemporary observer noted that
«the revolutionary agitation is not receding, all the contrary, it is
gaining strength, predominating in our country, among the wor-
king classes, the influence of anarchism, which has caused the vio-
lence and the social indiscipline characterising the most recent
strikes having been staged in Spain» 30.
Yet reformers believed that the political and revolutionary expression
of unions was simply temporary and stressed that unions were «not only
resistance societies [sociedades de resistencia]» but also legitimate parti-
cipants of the polity supplying socially useful institutions to their mem-
bers. Reformers noted that if one took the time «to take a look at the
rules governing many workers’ unions», it was easy to appreciate the
usefulness of «the articles containing the supply of vocational training,
the election of vocational committees, unemployment agencies, mutual
benefit and old age funds». They maintained that the main aim of unions
was not political, but «the elevation of wages, the shortening of the
workday, and the improvement of working conditions» 31. Even in more
conservative quarters, it was accepted that «the activities of unions not
only bring about material results but also contribute powerfully to crea-
te the habits of order and morality» 32.
Using an international comparison, reformers opposed to radical
Italian or Spanish unions, the example of the moderate British,
American or German unions, a line of reasoning they adopted from
French and Italian reformers. In Britain or Germany, unions «so power-
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ful that employers do not dare to refuse to negotiate with» had brought
about social peace and a decline in strike activity. Where unions were
weak, like in Italy, Spain or Russia, political radicalism, strikes and revo-
lutionary hopes were the norm 33. Considering that «the bitterness of stri-
kes is inversely related to the progress, the strength, and the discipline of
unions» 34, the stabilization of unions inevitably led to bread-and-butter
unionism, the respect for property rights, and the abandonment of poli-
tical radicalism. In this view, the control of strike-funds by a central
bureaucracy and the supply of institutions like friendly societies and
unemployment insurance tamed workers’ revolutionary hopes and com-
mitted them to a more gradualist agenda focused on economic objecti-
ves. Employers, the famous Republican academic Gumersindo de
Azcárate remarked, should not fight unions but rather «wish all their
workers joined the union», because a union «allows to substitute reflec-
tion for what previously was only impulse» 35. Reformers admired the
«self-control,» the «virility» and the «instruction» of the British trade
unionist, as opposed to the Spanish worker, considered to be too igno-
rant and hot-headed 36.
Following this line of reasoning, the role of the state was to sponsor
freely constituted unions of workers and collective bargaining as a
means to curb labour unrest. In an early formulation, the sociologist
Sanz Escartín asserted that «the future civilization, [...], must rest on fre-
ely constituted associations [...] able to harmonize all social interests
through a higher co-ordinating body» 37. Later on, reformers moved
away from harmonic views of society in which all conflicting interests
would be reconciled and ended up recognizing the necessary role of state
coercion and enforcement. Gumersindo de Azcárate argued that «the
moral duties of property are nowadays trusted to private initiative, [but]
there is no guarantee of their indispensable compliance, [therefore] it is
absolutely necessary to pass laws to make sure they are effective» 38.
Following this argument, the liberal Minister of Agriculture, Trade and
Industry, José Canalejas, affirmed in 1902 that «where the state does not
intervene to regulate or soften the battle of the classes, where govern-
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ments are reluctant to address the social problem, everything is burned
down by the anarchist fire» 39. He went on to argue that «the fact that
employers do not respect the law [mainly thinking about the non-recog-
nition of legal unions] is what drives thinkers [“hombres pensadores”]
towards the option of compulsory arbitration and the coercion of the
state». And finally concluded: «we require the worker to respect the law
and keep away from the streets [...] to make life in freedom viable,
making social progress possible, but let’s ask employers as well to respect
legal precepts» 40.
Instead of complying with employers’ demands to simply guarantee
the freedom to work, reformers believed that the end of the social ques-
tion would be brought about by the decided state sponsorship of arbi-
tration and conciliation procedures resting on powerful independent
unions. In the opinion of reformers, «the most effective [state] interven-
tion is to sponsor large unions, with strong funds making them power-
ful and conservative at the same time; the joint boards, elected by the
unions and employers’ associations, will follow to protect the common
good» 41. Considering the task of joint boards in Belgium, a Catalan repu-
blican deputy who favoured the compulsory arbitration of strikes clai-
med that
«those boards include workers and employers, [...] creating
among them the habit of friendship, fraternity, and affection,
which in the future will probably become a buffer against solvent
theories and against the dreadful ideas that the anarchists try to
instil in our working classes» 42.
Minister Canalejas summarized the optimistic view of reformers on
conciliation institutions when stating that «when workers’ associations
finally reach their full potential, there will be no more strikes» 43.
In spite of the existence of similar views among academic circles and
in some political groups, almost thirty years separate the early formula-
tions addressing the social question from the reforms required to the
passing of a bill on strikes and joint commissions in 1908 and 1909.
Three factors seem to explain this delay. First, the coalition of reformers
was still small and politically isolated. Republicans represented less than
ten per cent of the Chamber. Among the Liberals, there was a large group
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favouring a laissez-faire, abstencionista policy. Only those identified with
social Catholicism and regeneracionismo within the Conservative party
were decidedly committed to social legislation, albeit often not fully
accepting the right of workers to organize unions, and to state regulation
of class conflict. A second factor was political instability. Lacking politi-
cal leadership after the deaths of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo and
Práxedes Sagasta, Conservatives and Liberals were split into different
factions leading to unstable, short-lived governments unable to pass cru-
cial legislation. It was not until the «long» Conservative government of
Antonio Maura, himself not identified with the reformist factions of the
Conservatives, with a cohesive majority in Parliament, that the bills on
strikes and conciliation boards could be passed. Finally, a third, contri-
buting factor might have been the low levels of strike activity in the
period 1905-1909 which might have reduced opposition to any law regu-
lating industrial relations.
The strike laws passed by the Maura government established the ins-
titutions which could have led to the formal legal recognition of unions’
bargaining rights and a move towards an incipient corporatist organiza-
tion of industrial relations in Spain at the local or regional level.
Industrial tribunals had jurisdiction over labour contracts and were
designed to settle minor disputes avoiding costly strikes or the slower
ordinary tribunals. The law on conciliation boards allowed the local
boards of social reforms (juntas de reformas sociales, created by the 1900
accidents law) to arrange the settlement of strikes, if the contending par-
ties accepted to do so. The laws officially recognized unions by stipulating
their participation in mixed institutions with representatives of emplo-
yers and political authorities, while at the same time put a limit on the
ability of workers and employers to coerce each other.
The historical literature has considered these laws to be quite con-
servative, given the limitations on the workers’ right to strike. However,
this judgement does not take into account the political opposition to the
law and lacks comparative perspective: Belgium, Italy or France had
more restrictive laws, for instance establishing more severe penalties for
picket lines 44. Contemporary critics of conciliation procedures remarked
only some years later that «shortly after being passed, the law was imple-
mented in the social reality [sic] ...in its most extreme and radical
sense». Referring to the general strikes of 1911 and 1916, it concluded:
«this law is the cause of the terrifying general strikes we have witnessed
lately» 45.
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4. THE CONFLICT OVER THE FREEDOM TO WORK
It is clear, however, that the 1909 reforms failed to be implemented.
According to the strike data published by the Instituto de Reformas
Sociales (IRS) from 1905 to 1920, a local junta intervened in only 3 per
cent of the strikes in 1905-1909, while it only did so in 3.5 per cent of stri-
kes in 1910-1915. Using the strike data collected by the Catalan Museu
Social (Social Museum) for the period 1912-1915, local boards of emplo-
yers and employees only intervened in 5 per cent of the 315 recorded stri-
kes in the period 46. Writing with historical perspective, the Ministro de
Gobernación of the time, Juan De la Cierva, who, like Maura, did not have
any reformist credentials, lamented that the laws on strikes and concilia-
tion boards had not been enforced since he had left the ministry 47. In
1909, the labour inspectors of the Catalan provinces found that «with the
exception of very few towns, where industry is very important, in many
towns local boards have been barely organized but have never met, in
others they meet only rarely, their activities being generally fruitless» 48.
The labour inspectors in the Basque provinces remarked in 1911 that local
boards were «purely nominal, inert bodies, ignorant of their duties» 49.
The first problem was that participation in the arbitration boards was
voluntary. Labour inspectors mostly blamed employers for hindering the
institutionalization of conciliation boards. The labour inspectors of the
Catalan provinces claimed that «employers only intervene in them [the
boards] to avoid the harm that workers can cause to them». But the ins-
pectors went on to say that it was always «the members elected by the
workers who drive the boards to reach agreements» 50. Similarly, other
inspectors echoed the protest of employers about the activities of the
local boards, which employers grounded in the fact that the «board
members from the working class cannot put aside their hate for the
employers’ class or lack the necessary technical expertise» 51. Labour ins-
pectors in the Andalusian provinces lamented that «employers are not
willing to accept any demand put forward by the workers, because they
believe it is a humiliation» 52.
The second and more important factor is that an informal system of
strike resolution was already implemented in the first decades of the 20th
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53 On the origins of the institution: Risques Corbella (1995).
54 Data are from IRSb, years 1905 to 1909.
55 Friedman (1988), 7.
56 The two main aggregate sources of strike data for the period are: IRSb (various years),
covering the period 1905-1922, and Museu Social (1913-1916), which collect data on Cata-
lan strikes from 1912 to 1915.
57 In fact, they test their war-of-attrition model using 1880s data from the US because
of the existence of few compromises, probably because of limited state intervention in the
strike. Card and Olson (1995), 43.
century. Relying on the will of capitalists, formal corporatist institutions
could not substitute for a well-established system of strike arbitration
dependent on the intervention of state officials. Prefects, the highest state
authority at the level of the province, and occasionally mayors, had a fun-
damental role in the settling of disputes 53. In the period 1905-1909, some
external authority intervened in about 30 per cent of strikes, with almost
two thirds of these interventions being made by prefects 54. In the early
1910s, the proportion increased to 35 per cent of strikes, representing
about 60 per cent of strikers. To give some comparative dimension to these
numbers, in France in the period 1910-1914 with a very similar delegation
of state authority at the provincial or departmental level, the government
intervened in about 15 per cent of all strikes 55. In general, state mediation
in strikes had a characteristic advantage over purely voluntary systems of
conciliation: prefects could force recalcitrant employers into accepting
some of the demands of strikers because employers needed state protec-
tion to defend their establishments from picket lines. As I show below, the
conflict of interests between state officials and employers in Catalonia and
Biscay had been apparent since the early 20th century.
The published data on strikes allow us to measure the impact of pre-
fects’ and local authorities’ mediation on the settlement of strikes and, in
a second set of regressions, to identify the factors explaining the partici-
pation of state and local authorities in the conflict 56. The purpose here
is largely descriptive and is thought to provide a stimulus for further
research using strike data from Spain and other Western European
countries. One problem, impossible to solve at this stage, is the endoge-
neity of the state intervention in strikes with respect to strike characte-
ristics, mainly because instruments explaining strike success or state
intervention independently are not obvious. Moreover, following Card
and Olson (1995), the appropriate estimation strategy is to estimate
three duration models for different strike settlements —won strikes, lost
strikes, and compromises. However, Card and Olson (1995) did not
include state intervention in the strike in their war-of-attrition duration
model and there is no clear prediction of the effect of state intervention
on strike durations 57. Strikers might be willing to hold out longer becau-
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58 Card and Olson (1995), see also Huberman and Young (1999, 2002) for an extension
of the model to include compromise settlements to the strike.
59 What was understood by intervention of the civil governor is problematic. In the IRS
strikes I used the entry «observaciones» which included comments like «intervino el señor
Gobernador civil de la provincia» (the civil governor intervened) or «a propuesta del gober-
nador civil se avinieron las dos partes en conflicto» (workers and employers reached an agre-
ement after the initiative of the civil governor). The quality of this entry is good for the period
1905-1909 when each strike included a comment. This might imply that the IRS only selec-
ted a sub-sample of strikes for which it had complete information. Comparison of the IRS
data for Barcelona in 1905-1909 with those of other sources (Sastre (various years), howe-
ver, suggests the differences between both sources were not drastic. In 1905, the IRS gave
information on 25 strikes in the city of Barcelona, while Sastre collected 24. For 1906, the
IRS gives 19 strikes and Sastre 24. In 1907, the IRS counted 15 strikes and Sastre 21. Figu-
res for 1908 and 1909 are 19 and 22 and 12 and 12 respectively. We do not know, however,
what happened in more remote areas or in smaller cities. Strike data lose quality after 1910
when the IRS did not add comments for each strike about the type of settlement and pro-
bably focused more explicitly on the formation of conciliation boards and mixed commis-
sions after the passing of the 1909 law on strikes. A comparison of data from the IRS and
Museu Social shows how this was the case. In the period 1912-1915 the IRS reports 271stri-
kes in the Catalan provinces while the Museu gives 315. Of these, the IRS reported the gover-
nor intervened in only 4 per cent of the cases, while this proportion reaches almost 20 per
cent according to the Museu Social. The evidence on conciliation boards was more accurate
and consistent in both sources: the IRS reported that a local junta o comisión mixta settled
the strike in 5 per cent of the cases (13 out of 271), as did the data of the Musu Social (16
out of 315). Again, this check cannot be extended with confidence to other areas.
60 Won strikes were coded as «ganada totalmente», compromises as «ganada parcial-
mente» and lost strikes as «perdida». Distinguishing between won and lost strikes and com-
promises can involve several empirical problems if strike outcomes —for instance wage incre-
ases or shorter hours— are distributed continuously. However, it was the natural taxonomy
used to describe outcomes in the period, suggesting contemporaries identified clearly when
a strike was won, lost or only partially won. The distinction between successful and failed
se they know the state might eventually intervene or employers, because
state intervention magnifies the strikers’ threat and extends workers’
capitulation times, might consider capitulating earlier 58.
According to the strike data collected by the Instituto de Reformas
Sociales (IRS) from 1905 to 1909 civil governors intervened in almost a
fifth of strikes and mayors in 11 per cent of strikes 59. In order to assess
whether the participation of prefects favoured workers, a logistic regres-
sion was carried out in which the outcome of the strike depends on a set
of strike characteristics, geographical factors and year dummies, plus a
variable capturing the way in which the strike was settled (the control
group being the cases when no authority intervened in the settlement of
the strike). Focusing on the intervention of state officials from 1905 to
1909, their intervention was associated with an increase in the probabi-
lity of settling the strikes in favourable terms for the workers of 41 per
cent in the case of both complete and partial victories and 96 per cent
when only complete victories are considered (marginal effects calculated
from logit regressions in table 1) 60. Comparing the effect of state media-
strikes and compromises was adopted by Miguel Sastre in his yearbook of strikes in Barce-
lona between 1903 and 1914, by the IRS and later the Ministry of Labour between 1905 and
1935 and by the Museu Social from 1912 and 1915. This taxonomy was also used in the
French, Canadian or American data of the period. Sastre (various years), IRSb (various
years), Museu Social (various years). On American and French strike data see Friedman
(1988), 1-25. On Canada see Huberman and Young (1999).
61 In France, in the period 1895-1914, government intervention in strikes increased the
probability of partial or complete victory by 30 per cent.
62 Fusi (1975), 65-81; Cullà (1986), 87-91; Álvarez Junco (Madrid, 1990), 270-71; Ullman
(1968), 71; Reig (1986), 253-69.
tion on strike outcomes with the effect of other strike characteristics
shows how the intervention of prefects was the main predictor of strike
success 61.
Carrying out the same exercise with a sample of Catalan strikes in
1912-1915, the intervention of prefects raised the probability of partial
and complete victories by 44 per cent and of complete victories by 67 per
cent (coefficients in table 2). Mayors also had a large impact on the pro-
bability of reaching a compromise, but not on the probability of winning
the strike completely.
The fact that in both sets of strikes state intervention increased both
the number of complete victories and compromises proves that prefects
favoured workers, and, that if workers attracted the support of state offi-
cials, there were great chances of winning the dispute. These results
admittedly do not include all the range of actions by prefects, which
could entail arresting the main strike leaders, banning union meetings,
and crushing picket lines. But the analysis of both the 1905-1909 strikes
and the 1912-1915 strikes shows that: 1) a significant fraction of state
interventions in strikes favoured workers, as much as repression might
have favoured employers; 2) if workers could attract favourable state
intervention, this intervention was effective.
A second issue centres on an understanding of the determinants of
state intervention in strikes, i.e. when did prefects decide or receive
orders to support workers? I use the same strike data but now I use state
intervention as the dependent variable, which I consider depends on a
set of strike characteristics, geographical factors, electoral factors and
year dummies. Including electoral factors is largely exploratory here and
used to assess the reaction of the state to a wider support for anti-system
parties (Republicans and Socialists), which could be quite significant in
some of the main cities (Republicans, for example, dominated local poli-
tics in Valencia and Barcelona). Anti-system political movements sup-
ported the grievances of the labour movement, amplified the publicity of
strikes through the political press and provided the leadership in parti-
cular strikes 62.
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1. Strike outcomes, 2. Strike outcomes,
1905-1909 1905-1909
Victories and Victories only
compromises. Mean: 0.5 Mean: 0.34
Variables Means Coeff Mg eff Coeff Mg eff
Constant 1 1.69*** 1.73***
(0.65) (0.71)
Log (days on strike) 2.29 –0.4*** –25.84 –0.46***
(0.08) (0.09)
Log(strikers) 3.81 –0.07 –0.2***
(0.08) (0.09)
Log(striker rate) -0.45 0.48*** 17.69 0.45***
(0.14) (0.15)
City 10,000-25,000 0.17 0.22 0.37
(0.31) (0.33)
City 25,000-50,000 0.09 0.03 –0.3
(0.4) (0.44)
City 50,000-100,000 0.08 –0.14 0.1
(0.42) (0.45)
City over 100,000 0.4 –0.41 0.01
(0.31) (0.03)
Civil governor (yes=1) 0.17 0.69** 40.71 1.1*** 95.52
(0.29) (0.31)
Mayor (yes=1) 0.11 0.56* 32.6 0.35
(0.33) (0.36)
Junta Local (yes=1) 0.03 0.99 57.38 0.48
(0.53) (0.61)
Type of strike issue (5) Yes Yes
Type of industry (15) Yes Yes
Year dummies (4) Yes Yes
Region dummies (3) Yes Yes
Log L –328.43 –294.3
Chi-Squared 102.83 113.54
% correctly classified**** 67.15 74.82
Number of observations 548 548
TABLE 1
FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROBABILITY OF WINNING STRIKES, SPAIN 1905-1909
Source: IRSb, years 1905-1909.
Notes: ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at better than 1, 5 and 10 per cent in two
sided z-tests. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects measure the percentage change
on the estimated baseline probabilities caused by one standard deviation change in each par-
ticular variable’s mean, holding all other variables at their sample means. The estimated mar-
ginal effects of the dummy variables are changes from 0 to 1. Marginal effects in italics are sig-
nificant at standard levels of significance.
Region dummies: Mediterranean, South, North, with control group being the two
Castiles.
**** cut-off probability = 0.5.
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Looking at the determinants of state intervention in Spanish strikes
in 1905-1909 and the Catalan strikes in 1912-1915, it is clear that a stra-
tegic advantage existed in strikes attracting publicity. In the case of stri-
kes in 1905-1909, state officials were more likely to intervene in large
strikes, with an increase in one standard deviation in the number of stri-
Model 1 Model 2
Victories and Victories only
compromises. Mean: 0.57 Mean: 0.36
Variables Means Coeff Mg effect Coeff Mg effect
Constant 1 0.39 0.49
(0.75) (0.77)
Log (days on strike) 2.2 –0.26** –15.5 –0.28**
(0.1) (0.11)
Log(strikers) 4.15 –0.01 –0.16*
(0.09) (0.1)
Log(striker rate) –0.29 0.45* 11.03 0.29
(0.25) (0.26)
Union (Yes=1) 0.81 0.88** 53.46 0.82**
(0.41) (0.42)
Employers’ association 0.46 –0.05 –2.39 –0.16
(yes=1) (0.31) (0.32)
In Barcelona (city) (yes=1) 0.49 –0.44 0.01
(0.4) (0.42)
Civil governor (yes=1) 0.18 0.88** 43.57 0.74* 66.81
(0.4) (0.42)
Mayor (yes=1) 0.18 1.25** 58.51 0.43
(0.44) (0.42)
Junta Local (yes=1) 0.05 0.16 0.25
(0.64) (0.64)
Type of strike issue (4) Yes Yes
Type of industry (11) Yes Yes
Year dummies (3) Yes Yes
Province dummies (3) Yes Yes
Log L –181 –172
Chi-Squared 67.64 67.38
% correctly classified**** 71.97 69.43
Number of observations 315 315
TABLE 2
FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROBABILITY OF WINNING STRIKES,
CATALAN STRIKES 1912-1915
Source: Museu Social, years 1912-1915.
Notes: superscript ** indicates statistical significance at better than 5. Superscript * indi-
cates significance at better than 10 per cent. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects
measure the percentage change on the estimated baseline probabilities caused by one stan-
dard deviation change in each particular variable’s mean, holding all other variables at their
sample means. The estimated marginal effects of the dummy variables are changes from 0 to
1. Marginal effects in italics are significant at standard levels of significance.
**** correctly classified at cut-off probability = 0.5.
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kers increasing the probability of the mediation by state officials by 35
per cent (table 3). Prefects were almost four times more likely to get
involved in the case of strikes in cities over 50,000 inhabitants and where
the provincial share of the anti-system vote (provincial share of vote for
Stake intervention Intervention 1912-15.
in strikes, 1905-9 Catalan strikes only
Mean: 0.17 Mean: 0.18
Variables Means Coeff Mg eff Coeff Mg eff
Constant 1 –3.49*** –7.64***
(0.93) (1.55)
Log (days on strike) 2.28; 2.19 –0.21** 0.17
(0.12) (1.15)
Log (strikers) 3.81; 4.14 0.23** 35.29 0.62*** 151.67
(0.11) (0.15)
Log (strike partipation –0.45; –0.28 0.31 –0.01
rate) (0.23) (0.35)
Share antisystem vote 0.11 7.38*** 86.76
in 1907 (2.42)
City 25,000-50,000 0.09 0.67
(0.59)
City 50,000-100,000 0.08 1.08*
(0.55)
City over 100,000 0.4 0.76* 260
(0.39)
Strike in Barcelona 0.49 1.03** 159.5
(yes=1) (0.53)
Union workers (yes=1) 0.81 1.75**
(0.94)
Employers’ association 0.46 0.44
(yes=1) (0.45)
Type of strike issue (5) Yes Yes
Type of industry (11) Yes Yes
Year dummies (4) Yes Yes (3)
Region dummies (3) Yes Yesa
Log L –191.52 –95.77
Chi-Squared 122.39 105.94
% correctly classified**** 85.77 81.3
Number of observations 548 315
TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF STATE INTERVENTION IN STRIKES, SPAIN 1905-1915
Notes: ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the better than 1, 5 and 10 per cent in
two-sided z-tests. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects measure the percentage
change on the estimated baseline probabilities caused by one standard deviation change in
each particular variable’s mean, holding all other variables at their sample means. The esti-
mated marginal effects of the dummy variables are changes from 0 to 1. Marginal effects in
italics are significant at standard levels of significance. City size effects calculated with respect
to strikes in cities with less than 10,000 inhabitants.
a 4 provincial dummies. **** cut-off probability = 0.5.
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63 Provincial data on vote for republicans and socialists in the 1907 election in Martí-
nez Cuadrado (1969), volume 2, data appendix.
64 Bengoechea (1994), 210.
65 Peris Mencheta, DSC 1902, 3919.
66 DSC 1902, 3780. See another case, this time González Rothwoss in July 1903, in
Romero-Maura (1985), 226-27.
socialists and republicans) was largest, with one increase in one stan-
dard deviation in the share increasing the probability of intervention by
87 per cent 63. Considering Catalan strikes only (table 3), the prefect was
more than twice as likely to intervene in Barcelona with respect to other
cities and in larger than average strikes, with an increase in one standard
deviation in the number of strikers triggering a 150 per cent increase in
the probability of mediation, and three times more likely to intervene in
strikes of union workers.
In large cities, a successful strike required that the authorities did not
forbid meetings or crush demonstrations and picket lines to increase
participation. However, especially in big cities, employers also badly nee-
ded the protection of their establishments from strikers and demanded
that the authorities protect the freedom to work. Up until 1919, there is
no evidence of employers organising effectively private polices and
gangs of thugs to counterattack unions, except in isolated mining esta-
blishments and in some textile company towns 64. In this sense, the
monopoly over the violence directed against unions enjoyed by the state
guaranteed that employers depended upon state officials to resist stri-
kers. At least in the first two decades of the 20th century and especially
after 1910, employers’ interests clashed with those of state officials wan-
ting to protect public order and to avoid larger conflicts.
For example, in Catalonia, where prefects and employers were deeply
divided on issues of public order, prefects were criticized for being gover-
nadors a la madrilenya (civil governors in the style of Madrid) because
they did not handle conflicts firmly enough. In the parliamentary deba-
te over the Barcelona general strike of 1902, Catalan deputies blamed the
prefect of Barcelona, Miguel Socías, for having allowed a metal workers’
strike to derive into a general strike. In this case, Socías was accused of
tolerating the revolutionary meetings that preceded the general strike. A
conservative journalist backing the complaints of employers remarked
that «the responsibilities of the prefect do not entail meddling in the
affairs between workers and employers, but only imposing the respect
for the law and the liberty to work, the same for workers and employers,
without siding with one or the other» 65. The Catalan employer Rusiñol
interrupted the speech of the Minister of Interior, who was defending his
subordinate, and manifested that «we [employers] could not visit him,
we did not trust him» 66.
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67 DSC 1903, 1285.
68 Urquijo, DSC 1903, 1313; Fusi (1975), 241.
69 The Spanish sentence was «a los pechos del gobernador civil se ha ido amamantando
esta huelga general». Bertran y Musitu, DSC 1910, 1630.
70 Ibid., 1630-1631. Groups expressing their opposition to state policy included Econó-
mica de Amigos del País, Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, Círculo de la Unión Mercantil, Cámara
de Comercio and all the economic societies (sociedades económicas) of Barcelona.
Likewise, in the mining strike of Bilbao of 1903, employers demanded
the protection of their establishment from strikers and the enforcement of
the freedom to work. Once the strike had started, a Basque deputy expres-
sed in Parliament: «I require the Minister of Interior [...] to give firm ins-
tructions to the first civil authority in the province of Biscay so that ever-
yone’s rights are respected, especially the right to work for those who want
to work» 67. Later on, the main employers’ association, the Círculo
Mercantil é Industrial, wrote a telegram to some of its allied deputies
demanding more protection from the state: «we beg you to ask the govern-
ment about its position on the incidents that have taken place in Bilbao
during the last strike which have forced us to close our establishments».
And it was added: «we deplore the passivity of the authorities» 68.
Similarly, in the large metal workers’ strike of Barcelona in 1910, the
prefect was accused by a conservative Catalan deputy: «it was a conflict
limited to a negligible number of workers [...], but the civil governor of
Barcelona tolerated every class of intimidation». And he went on to
argue that «if the civil governor had remembered there existed a law on
strikes, I am sure that we would not have reached today’s situation [the
general strike]. I don’t doubt that had the prefect protected the freedom
to work, nothing of this would have happened». According to him, when
the strike was declared «the prefect said he was going to allow commit-
tees of strikers to go to the factories where the strike was not being sup-
ported to invite workers to join the strike». The deputy concluded
bluntly: «the general strike has been fed by the prefect» 69. The situation
finally prompted employers to tell President Canalejas that:
«revolutionary meetings in which attacks to certain individuals
are encouraged [...] go unpunished, with the result that those who
decide to work are attacked on a daily basis. [...] We complain
about this incitement to crime being tolerated, despite being pena-
lized by our laws. The non-compliance of these laws is the main
contributor to the current state of agitation and social anarchy» 70.
However, in spite of the pressure brought to bear on them, state offi-
cials showed a great deal of autonomy. As Soledad Bengoechea put it in
the case of the 1913 textile workers strike:
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71 Bengoechea (1994), 105.
72 Ossorio (1946), 45; in 1902 Ossorio published a book on workplace accidents: (Osso-
rio, 1902).
73 Cuadrat (1976), 546-47.
«From simple complaints, employers moved on to action. The
visits to the prefect, Buenaventura Muñoz, multiplied. Employers
demanded a firm handling of strikers and picket lines which did
not allow the return to work for those wishing to do so. In spite of
employers’ pressure, Muñoz was not willing to use force but pre-
ferred to arbitrate the conflict through a negotiation with each of
the parties» 71.
It is not clear why state officials chose to favour conciliation over
repression. In spite of the presence of some committed reformers like
the civil governors of Conservative governments like Eduardo Sanz
Escartín or Ángel Ossorio, who was close to Gabriel Maura Gamazo,
another well known reformer 72, the social doctrine of civil governors
was never exposed clearly and probably was not homogenous. However,
most of their actions show a more than occasional willingness to curb
labour militancy by supporting some form of collective bargaining.
Nonetheless, when strikes escalated in 1903 or 1910 and labour mili-
tancy did not give any proof of restraint, the same officials did not hesi-
tate to crush the strike movement as they did in Barcelona in 1903, or
with the general strike movement in 1901-1902 and 1910-1911.
The general strike of Sabadell in 1910 gives an example of the transi-
tion of state policy from conciliation to repression. Following an episo-
de of lay offs of union workers in the French company Seydoux, the local
federation of unions organized a strike in protest. The employers’ asso-
ciation, the Unión Patronal, ordered a lock-out. The state initially adop-
ted a conciliatory stance, while groups of civil guards protected some of
the largest establishments to guarantee the freedom to work 73. The con-
ciliatory policy of the state reached the point that the Minister of Interior
visited Sabadell in an attempt to seal an agreement between workers and
employers. When the Minister called the contending parties to a mee-
ting, the President of the employers’ association did not attend it. Shortly
after, the local federation of unions rallied workers towards the general
strike. This brought about the prompt arrests of the leaders of the fede-
ration, the closing of unions offices, and the crushing of demonstrations.
Even in these episodes, government policy on arrests of strike leaders
was not dramatically harsh, except under very exceptional circumstan-
ces such as the railway workers’ strike of 1912, the general strike of 1917
or in the 1919 Barcelona general strike. Episodes like the Barcelona
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75 Sastre (1904), 72-74.
76 Sastre (1905), 85.
77 Sastre (1906), 67.
78 Pestaña (1974), 176.
Tragic Week of 1909, which ended with a disproportionately hard res-
ponse —several death penalties—, cannot be counted as a normal strike.
Looking at state policy in the most contentious city in the period,
Barcelona, Soledad Bengoechea has argued that the policy of the govern-
ment was the strategic arrest of the strike leaders to stop the strike early
on 74. Yet there is no sense that the state used all its coercive power to
deter strikers. During the strike wave of the summer of 1903 when the
state decided to switch to a more repressive policy, 371 persons were
arrested out of 52,015 strikers (0.71 per cent). Of these 371, 274 ended
up in prison. Of this last group, 181 spent less than one week in jail,
while the longest stay in prison was three months. Of the 264 jailed wor-
kers, 127 were prosecuted but only one was finally convicted and there
were 12 dismissals. On the remaining 115 cases, the Ministry of Interior
García Álix issued a collective pardon through a Royal Decree passed on
the 14th August 1903 75. In 1904, still in Barcelona, 160 strikers were
arrested out of 11,047 (1.45 per cent). Of those, Miguel Sastre remarked
«some of them went to prison, but they were freed almost immedia-
tely» 76. In 1905, there were 1,676 strikers of whom 58 were arrested.
Again, Sastre remarked that «most of the arrested strikers did not go to
jail and were freed almost immediately by either the Prefect or the
Judge» 77. This situation did not change dramatically in the 1910s before
1919. For example, Ángel Pestaña of the National Confederation of
Labour, commented on the situation from 1914 to 1919 that with respect
to unions:
«Conservatives or Liberals were exactly the same. They went easily
from tolerance to arbitrariness. In the blink of an eye, we were all
in prison for no reason, then unexpectedly, all sorts of advantages
were granted to us [...]».
And he went on:
«the prisons in Barcelona could be suddenly filled with unionists,
and then they would be freed immediately. For almost no reason,
union locals were closed, union leaders were arrested, the pay-
ment of union dues was forbidden, and employers were granted
the permission to lay off union workers. But in few days, all these
severe measures were repealed» 78.
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79 Bengoechea (1998) is the standard reference.
80 Kaplan (1992), 184.
There were obvious and serious costs for labour activists in organi-
zing collective action, but even when the state decided to repress labour
leaders, the costs did not seem to be punitively high except in exceptio-
nal circumstances. When especially anarcho-syndicalist leaders were
repressed in the early 1920s, it was the employers and the military, not
the state, those who reacted strongly against labour militancy 79.
5. THE DYNAMICS OF WORKERS’ AND EMPLOYERS’
MOBILIZATION
By occasionally supporting unions in big cities like Barcelona,
Zaragoza, Valencia or Bilbao, the state gave some breathing space to
parts of the labour movement connected with radical ideologies and
anti-system political movements. By protecting strikers, state policies
gave incentives to strategies aimed at enlarging participation in strikes
through appeals to the general strike, public demonstrations, and violent
picket lines. State policy, in this sense, reinforced the political outlook of
unions by making them strategic bargainers with the state. By adopting
a conciliatory stance in large cities, precisely where the links between
the union movement and radical politics were closest, the state protec-
ted unions with close links to radical movements. The short-lived suc-
cesses of the Regional Federation of Workers’ Resistance Societies
(FRSOR) in the early 20th century, of Workers’ Solidarity in 1907-9 in
Barcelona or the National Confederation of Labour (CNT) in 1910-1911
and later on after 1916, and also to some extent the consistent advances
made by the Socialist General Workers’ Union (UGT) reflected, in fact,
the strategic advantages of political, visible strikes in the largest cities
and the ability of these unions to gather large numbers of workers for-
cing the state to intervene in the strike adopting a conciliatory stance.
Unions, on the other hand, used the publicity of mass demonstrations in
large cities to tilt public opinion in their favour. In this context, large
working class institutions were in a far superior position to present stri-
kers’ demands as struggles for justice, rather than struggles to protect
the interests of narrowly-defined groups of workers. Temma Kaplan in
her account of the patterns of popular protest in Barcelona tells us how
female textile workers and their children used to march in the main stre-
ets the Barcelona from the Plaza Cataluña to the building of the Civil
Government during the general strike in the textile industry in 1913 80. In
the Bilbao minig strike of 1910, it was decided that the children of stri-
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84 For example, the foreword by Bartomeu Amengual in Sastre, 1903, 5-6. Amengual was
Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce of Barcelona from 1902 to 1957. An example of a his-
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king miners would be lodged temporarily with families of workers in
other trades. The images of parting children contributed decisively to the
backing of the press and public opinion to the strike 81.
Following the same logic, unions tended to group their demands in a
rapid series of related strikes, an enlargement of conflicts which in some
cases led to general strikes. This was, for instance, the case of the gene-
ral strike in Barcelona in 1902, starting from the demands of metal wor-
kers, then extending them to other sectors, especially those involved with
the distribution of goods (for example dockers) and with transport (like
tramways) 82. This was also the case of the mining strikes in the area of
Bilbao, when miners extended the conflict to all other trades in Bilbao,
especially transport 83.
The ideological outlook of unions in the period did not reflect wor-
kers’ ideological preferences but rather the survival probabilities of dif-
ferent types of unions. When confronted with state repression and the
banning of «political» federations of unions like the FSROR in 1902 and
the CNT in 1911, the remaining unions were those of above average bar-
gaining power like the craft unions of local artisans and skilled workers,
protected by their small numbers, control over the production process,
and a strong sense of group identity. This contrasted with the experien-
ce of unions in large sectors like the metal industries, textiles or mining,
employing a large mass of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, which
went through periods of collective de-mobilization. The reduction of
strike activity and the survival of bread-and-butter conservative unions
that followed the crushing of strike waves did not mean that naturally
conservative workers «hated» or disliked strikes and radical politics, as
employers’ supporters claimed and some labour historians seem to have
accepted 84, but instead reflected dwindling political opportunities for
organized labour and the beginning of a cycle of state repression.
Evidence presented in this paper regarding state policy on strikes
shows however that, even in periods of low strike activity like 1905-1909,
the support provided by state officials to strikers was substantial. In
periods of social upheaval, employers were well aware that strikes thre-
atened established property rights. With employers’ authority put to
question, employers organized associations to check the rise of labour
and lobby against the state’s sometimes hesitant support for the labour
movement. When organized, these employers’ associations opposed any
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85 Asociación de Fabricantes de las Cuencas del Ter y del Fresser (1902); Rusiñol (1902).
86 Díaz Morlan (1999), 48.
87 Torres Villanueva (1998), 72-74.
88 Olábarri (1978), 224-247.
89 Bengoechea (1994), 60.
mediation settlement with strikers and required the government simply
to protect the freedom to work. In setting up these institutions, the
employers’ main objective was not to find a common voice in collective
bargaining but to defend the open shop and, in extreme cases, to orga-
nize a lock-out. In general, they opposed any kind of state intervention
in labour matters except the protection of their establishments from pic-
ket lines. For example, after the textile general strike in the Ter Valley in
1901, the Employers’ Association of the Ter and Fresser Valleys, fearing
«that the government, believing to curb the social problem [la cuestión
social], with its lugubrious procession of strikes and mutinies, might
sanction a law on permanent industrial tribunals», published a pamph-
let to publicize «the principles backing our [their] deeply rooted views
against the passing by the state of arbitration and conciliation tribu-
nals» 85. Several examples show that employers mainly mobilized to
check working class mobilization and also to lobby state officials to pro-
tect the freedom to work during strikes.
In Biscay, the Círculo Minero, the employers’ association of Biscay
mining employers, was not concerned with labour issues at its inception.
Created in 1887, the Círculo was on the verge of disappearing having fai-
led to attract enough members. In 1887, the association lobbied against
the tax imposed by the municipality of Bilbao on each ton of exported
iron 86. But with little activity in the following two years, the Círculo only
met once. However, the May Day general strike of 1890 radically altered
the Círculo’s focus. In 1891, it agreed to finance the building of barracks
to shelter units of the Guardia Civil in the mining towns. Other means of
countering the spread of unions and the Socialist Party included the call
to crush strikes and union meetings, the laying off of Socialist workers
and the drawing up of «black lists» to force militant workers to migra-
te 87. In the mid 1890s, a federation of employers’ associations, the Centro
Industrial de Vizcaya, united diverse employers’ associations into one
powerful employers’ union 88.
Likewise, the Barcelona building construction employers’ associa-
tion, the Centro de Contratistas de Obras y de Maestros Albañiles, was ori-
ginally created in 1892 mainly to lobby local and state authorities and
after 1900 played an important role in the protests against the fiscal
reforms undertaken by the Conservative Finance Minister Raimundo
Fernández Villaverde 89. However, after a strike in 1901, most of the
90 Ibid., 78-79.
91 Ibid., 83.
92 Ibid., 110. Other cases of employers’ mobilization, for example after the general strike
in Logroño in 1904 and 1908: Gil Andrés (2000), 86-92.
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emphasis of the Centro was directed towards the co-ordination of emplo-
yers’ resistance to strikes. Similarly, the Sociedad de Industriales
Mecánicos and the Gremio de Industriales Metalarios, uniting employers
of the metal industries of Barcelona, were organized around 1900 in res-
ponse to the tax reforms of Villaverde 90. As in the case of building cons-
truction, a new Sociedad de Industriales Mecánicos y Metalarios was cre-
ated in 1903 to curb labour unrest 91. In the strike wave of 1910, these
two sectors formed the backbone of the newly constituted Federación
Patronal, an attempt to unite all employers of Barcelona into one single
organisation 92.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper tries to understand the failure to implement institutional
change in Spanish industrial relations and to describe an existing insti-
tutional equilibrium by analyzing state policy on the contested issue of
the right to associate and strike in early 20th century Spain. I argue that
the effective formalization of a system of industrial relations failed espe-
cially because the state did not force employers to participate in formal
collective bargaining institutions. Despite the failure to enforce legisla-
tion, I show how there was already an informal system of strike arbitra-
tion aimed at protecting public order in the main Spanish cities and a
strategy by the state to control working class mobilization by recogni-
zing limited rights to unions and strikers. I stress that the state generally
sided with the interests of workers forcing employers to recognize some
of the demands of workers to end the strike quickly. This institutional
capacity of the state depended on its monopoly of violence and its abi-
lity to guarantee the freedom to work. During the Restauración, emplo-
yers and state officials had frequent conflicts over the protection of the
freedom to work. Finally, the paper evaluates the possible dynamic
effects of state intervention in strikes. I argue that state intervention pro-
tected radical, politicised unions in the main cities and alienated emplo-
yers against the Restoration state.
This article might provide a basis for an understanding of the pro-
cesses of collective mobilisation and de-mobilisation in Spain. However,
the main aim here is neither to provide a definitive analysis of the dyna-
mics of union growth in Spain during the Restauración, nor to offer an
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explanation for the peculiar institutional characteristics of Spanish
unions and other forms of working class collective action (which would
require more comparative analysis). I want to stress, however, the
importance of putting the state at the centre of any account of the
Spanish labour movement. Historians have emphasised bottom-up for-
ces when explaining the rising trend in working class collective action in
Spain. One of the conclusions reached here is the need to balance the
story between bottom-up and top-down forces, focusing on the crucial
interaction between strikers, employers, and state officials.
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